

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COMMANDER NAVY REGION SOUTHWEST 937 N. HARBOR DR. SAN DIEGO, CA 92132-0058

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830 Ser N00/570 10 Jun 16

From: Commander, Navy Region Southwest
To: Commander, U. S. Fleet Forces Command

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION OF THE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES EMPLOYED AT NAVAL AIR STATION LEMOORE, CALIFORNIA AND THE

BREACH OF SECURITY ON 30/31 MARCH 2016

Ref: (a) CAPT (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C). ltr of 6 May 16

Encl: (1) Diagram of NAS Lemoore Operations Side internal barriers

1. This investigation was very thorough and balanced. I am satisfied that it identified the root causes of the unauthorized access to Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore. Further, the investigating officer has provided specific recommendations that will enhance Entry Control Point (ECP) security and reduce the likelihood of unauthorized ECP penetrations from similar future events. I approve the Findings of Fact (FF) and opinions of reference (a) with the following modifications.

2. Findings of Fact

ð	a. $(D)(7)(E)&(F)$.		_
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c. (b)(7)(E)&(F).		
3. Opinions		
a, (b)(7)(E)&(F).	+.	
. (3)(1)(2)(1)		
b. (b)(7)(E)&(F).		


c. Opinion 49 states, "The Commanding Officer, Captain (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C). has a firm knowledge of security requirements and continually assesses his installation's capability to meet security and AT/FP requirement, plays an active role in leading NASL NSF, and has demonstrated keen judgment and insight into the security practices of NASL, appropriately responded to the gate runner incident, and effectively managed the installation's recovery and reporting requirements." I strongly concur with this assessment.

d. (b)(7)(E)&(F).		

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- 4. <u>Recommendations</u>. Due to the number and scope of the recommendations, I have included all of the recommendations from the report in this endorsement with their original numbering and provide comments on each.
 - a. Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) enterprise
- (1) Recommend all CNIC Dispatch Centers immediately develop a comprehensive list of all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, emergency services organizations, and emergency management organizations that support associated CNIC installations and validate every primary contact number. Once the list and contact numbers are validated with two-way communications, the list should be verified every three to six months to ensure its integrity.

COMPLETE in Navy Region Southwest (NRSW). Based on the statement of Mr. (b)(6)&(b)(7)(C)., this action had been accomplished in NRSW twice in the last five years before this incident. After this incident, the NRSW Region Dispatch Center (RDC) completed this task on 12 April 2016 and will conduct and document quarterly validation/verification in the future.





(8) Recommend procurement of a communications capability that interfaces with local and state law enforcement agencies, emergency services organizations, and emergency management organizations. This capability should be periodically exercised at the tactical level to validate compatibility and connectivity during integrated training exercises.

ONGOING. While there were a number of human factors that contributed to this incident, the most significant was the failure of timely communications between CHP and NAS Lemoore/NRSW dispatchers. The incident would likely have ended at the ECP had NSF personnel been aware of the ongoing CHP pursuit prior to the vehicle arriving at the ECP. The Enterprise Land Mobile Radio System (ELMR) is a narrow band, digital, encrypted radio system that uses the internet to allow our radios to communicate on base, between bases and to other Regions. Most local law enforcement partners do not have this capability. CHP dispatch attempted to contact Navy dispatch via phone beginning at 2340 – five minutes before the JGC made it to Post 3. NRSW is exploring potential technological solutions to this challenge.



(10) Recommend an assessment of the Mission Profile Validation – Protection (MPV-P) for all installations to ensure the installations and NSF are being provided adequate manpower, resources, and physical security equipment/systems to respond to worst case scenario threats with sufficient on-watch personnel and equipment in order to neutralize an escalating threat within the boundaries of the installation.

CONCUR. The most recent review of MPV-P was conducted at the CNIC Manpower Modeling Working Group from 18 through 22 April 2016. The NSF Phasing Plan strategy prioritizes filling valid positions for External ECP and Primary Patrol units (b)(7) (E)&(F).

(11) Recommend all installations assess the effectiveness of their ASF continuing training program. (b)(7)(E)&(F).

(b)(7)(E)&(F).

ONGOING in NRSW. ASF personnel attend eight hours of training per month in addition to their two days of watch standing. Required training and updates are accomplished during that time. ASF are also included in ECP related drills during their watches.



(13) Recommend installations conduct a Table Top Exercise (TTX) on an annual basis that addresses local procedures and practices in locating unauthorized personnel and vehicles aboard an installation, to include coordination with local and state law enforcement agencies. The TTX should address the tactical differences between the hours of day light and darkness.


COMPLETE (b)(7)(E)&(F).

(14) Recommend all installations assess the effectiveness of local policies regarding ECP log books and supervisory reviews, to include documentation of material deficiencies at each ECP. Furthermore, installations should evaluate the involvement of the Physical Security Officer in the effectiveness and timeliness of resolving material deficiencies at ECPs.

COMPLETE in NRSW. NRSW SOP 4033 requires shift supervisors to check the posts twice per shift and sign the log book. Security Department Operations Officers and Deputy Chiefs of Police are required to conduct weekly checks of the posts. This item is inspected during the CART/FEP process.

b. NAS Lemoore

(1) (b)(7)(E)&(F).




(5) Recommend NASL conduct an administrative audit of all Security Department supervisory reviews and post check requirements and take corrective actions as appropriate.


COMPLETE. NAS Lemoore has conducted an audit of all log books and implemented additional procedures to standardize post checks.

(6) Recommend NASL conduct an operational stand-down training session within the Security Department with a focus on defense-in-depth and challenges associated with executing physical security and law enforcement policies. Report the results to the installation CO with a plan of action and milestones to correct identified deficiencies.

COMPLETE. NAS Lemoore CO and Security Officer conducted stand-down training sessions with the Security Watch Sections on 5 April and 12 April 2016. The Security Officer has developed a report for the CO with a plan of action and milestones to correct identified deficiencies.

(7) Recommend NASL formalize the watch bill generation, approval and modification process to ensure supervisors are involved in assessing the effectiveness and executability of the watchbill.





NRSW is actively exploring process improvements and material solutions to improve and simplify communication interoperability with all local law enforcement and other mutual aid partners.

M. K. RICH

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